Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius — Text and Context

I. Of the beginnings of Cities in general, and in particular of that of Rome

II. Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them the Roman Commonwealth belonged

III. Of the accidents which led in Rome to the creation of Tribunes of the People, whereby the Republic was made more perfect

IV. That the dissensions between the Senate and Commons of Rome made Rome free and powerful

V. Whether the guardianship of public freedom is safer in the hands of the Commons or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to acquire power, or they who seek to maintain it, are the greater cause of commotions

VI. Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive such a Government as would have composed the differences between the Commons and the Senate

VII. That to preserve liberty in a State, there must exist the right to accuse

VIII. That calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the power to accuse is useful

IX. That to give new institutions to a Commonwealth, or to reconstruct old institutions on an entirely new basis, must be the work of one Man

X. That in proportion as the founder of a Kingdom or Commonwealth merits praise, he who founds a Tyranny deserves blame

XI. Of the Religion of the Romans

XII. That it is of much moment to make account of Religion; and that Italy, through the Roman Church, being wanting therein, has been ruined

XIII. Of the use the Romans made of Religion in giving institutions to their City; in carrying out their enterprises; and in quelling tumults

XIV. That the Romans interpreted the auspices to meet the occasion; and made a prudent show of observing the rites of Religion even when forced to disregard them; and any who rashly slighted Religion they punished

XV. How the Samnites, as a last resource in their broken fortunes, had recourse to Religion

XVI. That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any accident it become free, can hardly preserve that freedom

XVII. That a corrupt People obtaining freedom can hardly preserve it

XVIII. How a free Government existing in a corrupt City may be preserved, or not existing may be created

XIX. After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself: but after one weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second

XX. That the consecutive reigns of two valiant Princes produce great results: and that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of a succession of valiant Rulers by whom their power and growth are rapidly extended

XXI. That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a Commonwealth to be without a National Army

XXII. What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman Horatii and the three Alban Curiatii

XXIII. That we should never hazard our whole fortunes, where we put not forth our entire strength; for which reason to guard a defile is often hurtful

XXIV. That well-ordered States always provide rewards and punishments for their Citizens; and never set off deserts against misdeeds

XXV. That he who would reform the institutions of a free State, must retain at least the semblance of old ways

XXVI. That a new Prince in a city or province of which he has taken possession, ought to make everything new

XXVII. That Men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly bad

XXVIII. Whence it came that the Romans were less ungrateful to their citizens than were the Athenians

XXIX. Whether a People or a Prince is the more ungrateful

XXX. How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of ingratitude; and how a Captain or Citizen may escape being undone by it

XXXI. That the Roman Captains were never punished with extreme severity for misconduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely through their ignorance or want of judgment, were not punished at all

XXXII. That a Prince or Commonwealth should not defer benefits until they are forced to yield them

XXXIII. When a mischief has grown up in, or against a State, it is safer to temporize with it than to meet it with violence

XXXIV. That the authority of the Dictator did good and not harm to the Roman Republic; and that it is, not those powers which are given by the free suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious Citizens usurp for themselves that are pernicious to a State

XXXV. Why the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although brought about by the free and open suffrage of the Citizens, was hurtful to the liberties of that Republic

XXXVI. That Citizens who have held the higher offices of a Commonwealth should not disdain the lower