Theism and Humanism Being the Gifford Lectures Delivered at the University of Glasgow, 1914 — Reading Notes

The Author's Stance on Rational Belief

Balfour positions himself against what he calls "empirical agnosticism," which he dismisses as a "blind alley." He insists that a sufficient belief system must include an account of itself as a product of natural causes and must be logical enough to explain why non-rational causes have produced rational outcomes. This self-referential demand is a distinctive feature of his argument: he wants a philosophy that can justify its own origin.

He does not claim to have achieved this ideal. Instead, his aim is "far more modest": to place common-sense beliefs and science in a setting that preserves their intellectual value. The tone is combative yet measured, as he invites anyone who disagrees to "show me a better way."

Perception and Common Sense

In Lecture VI, Balfour examines the ordinary beliefs of "the plain man" about the material world. He notes that common sense distinguishes appearance from reality—things change appearance with a change of the observer's position, but the thing itself remains unchanged. Yet common sense does not infer that perception is indirect; it holds that we perceive external things directly, not as mental copies.

Balfour emphasizes that common sense never supposes that "esse and percipi are identical"—that is, to be is not the same as to be perceived. He argues that this naive realism, though difficult to justify, is the working creed of everyday life and science. His analysis is precise, focusing on how common sense handles the gap between appearance and reality without falling into idealism.

The Challenge of Justifying Beliefs

Balfour acknowledges that our stock of beliefs about the world may be "difficult to justify" but insists they are not impossible to describe. He points out that common sense treats material things as extended in space and time, and that observation does not alter the object perceived. This leads to a tension: common sense is compelled to distinguish appearance from reality, yet it denies that perception is mediated by mental representations.

He does not resolve this tension in the excerpts. Instead, he sets up the problem for his larger argument: if common sense and science are to be trusted, they need a metaphysical grounding that explains why our cognitive faculties are reliable. Theism, he suggests, provides that grounding by ensuring that the causes of our beliefs are also reasons for their truth.

The Rhetoric of the Lectures

Balfour's prose is formal but not dry; he uses rhetorical questions and direct challenges to engage his audience. For example, he writes, "Let him that thinks otherwise show me a better way." The lectures were delivered orally, and the written version retains a sense of spoken argument, with phrases like "I say this, however, not as an excuse for poor workmanship, but only as an explanation of long delay."

He also employs metaphor, calling empirical agnosticism a "blind alley" and describing the ideal system as one that is "living, logical, and sufficient." The tone is that of a public intellectual addressing a university audience—confident, slightly combative, and aware of the limitations of his own project.

Readers should approach this volume as a philosophical argument that proceeds by negative critique as much as by positive construction. Balfour is more concerned with exposing the inadequacies of naturalism than with fully developing a theistic alternative. The excerpts show a thinker who values clarity and intellectual honesty, even when admitting the difficulty of his task. Those interested in early twentieth-century philosophy of religion, or in the intersection of politics and philosophy, will find this a distinctive voice.

Reading Balfour’s careful defense of theism, I felt the quiet ache of a world already slipping away—1914, after all. It reminded me, oddly, of old notes on The Spirit Land, where the unseen was taken so gently for granted. Both speak to a longing I half-recognize. At times, I The Spirit Land — Reading Companion just to feel that hush again, before the certainties broke.