Doctrine of the Will — A Reader’s Guide

Definitions and the Central Dispute

Mahan devotes considerable space to defining key terms such as liberty, necessity, and motive. He insists that liberty is opposed to necessity, not to influence, and that the will is not always determined by the strongest motive. This directly challenges Edwards's claim that the will is as the greatest apparent good. Mahan argues that the will can choose between objects known to be equal, a possibility necessitarians deny. His definitions are precise and intended to clear away confusion before the main argument begins.

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom

A significant portion of the text addresses the apparent contradiction between divine foreknowledge and free will. Mahan argues that the conflict arises only if we conceive of God's foreknowledge as operating like our own—by induction from causes. He suggests that God may perceive future free acts directly, just as we perceive past ones by memory. This analogy, he admits, is difficult to conceive, but he insists that the mystery is no greater than that of memory. He then charges necessitarians with inconsistency: they appeal to mystery in religion yet assume they fully understand God's mode of knowing when arguing against liberty.

Moral Responsibility and the Will

Mahan holds that obligation is predicable only of the will, and that men are not responsible for the sin of others. He distinguishes between God's purposes and his will, arguing that God may purpose moral evil without willing it. The death of the incorrigible is preordained but not willed by God, and God is not responsible for it. Sin remains a mystery, but Mahan insists that the doctrine of liberty is the doctrine of the Bible. Throughout, he maintains that the will's freedom is essential to moral accountability, a point he defends against necessitarian objections.

Readers approaching Doctrine of the Will should attend to Mahan's careful definitions and his method of reasoning from revelation. The work is a sustained argument, not a neutral survey, and it presupposes familiarity with Edwards's Freedom of the Will. Mahan's tone is combative but scholarly, and his use of analogy—especially the comparison of divine foreknowledge to memory—is a distinctive feature. The book rewards close reading of its logical structure and its engagement with opposing views.

Flipping through Mahan’s crisp arguments about will and necessity, I found myself thinking of another, stranger volume—The Inevitable Crimes of Celibacy The Vices of Convents and Monasteries, Priests and Nuns — Background and Themes. Both wrestle with what happens when human desire meets an unyielding rule. Mahan dissects freedom abstractly; the other, quietly, shows lives crushed by its denial. A single thread connects them, I suppose.