Pax mundi — Story, Setting & Ideas
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rance was in the same way condemned to pay 18 million francs to the United States of America for unlawful seizure of vessels; in 1818 a threatening dispute between Spain and the United States of America was settled by arbitration, and a contention between these and England was arranged by the Emperor of Russia, who was chosen as arbitrator, etc.
The best known of such disputes was the so-called Alabama question, which threatened a desolating world-war. This affair sprang out of the North American civil war 1861-65. The Southern States had privateers built in England, among which the _Alabama_ especially wrought great mischief to the Northerners. The Government of the Union considered that England had broken her neutrality in allowing the equipment of the privateer, and requested compensation.
A bitter feeling grew up and war appeared inevitable. But on January 24th, 1869, an agreement was happily entered into, which, with fresh negotiations, led to the Washington treaty, May 8th, 1871. In harmony with this the dispute was referred for settlement to a Court of Arbitration consisting of five members, of which England and the United States each chose one, and the neutral states of Italy, Switzerland, and Brazil, likewise each chose one. These five met on December 15th, 1871, as a tribunal of arbitration, at Geneva, and delivered their judgment on September 14th following (four votes against England's one), that the English Government had made a breach in its duty as a neutral power with respect to some of the privateers under consideration, and therefore England would have to pay an indemnity of 15-1/2 million dollars to the United States.[9]
England bowed to the award and fulfilled her duty.
In the same way the powerful insular kingdom voluntarily submitted to settlement in the weary contention regarding the possession of Delagoa Bay and the surrounding region on the east coast of Africa. The dispute was entrusted for settlement, in 1874, to the President of the French Republic, MacMahon, and he decided in July, 1875, in favour of Portugal. That the new contention between these two States, which for some time now has excited an inflammable spirit, not only in Portugal, but in other countries as well, will be arranged in the same friendly manner, there is but little doubt.
The claim of Portugal is much older than that of England. Its special ground is the discovery of the coast which was made by Portuguese mariners three hundred years ago. The Portuguese urge, that since the coast is theirs, they have a right to go as far inland as they choose and place the country thus entered under their dominion. They say further, that they have made a treaty with a native ruler over a kingdom which stretches far inland, and that ruined fortresses are still to be found which show that they once had this distant region in possession. To this assertion Lord Salisbury answers, that where ruined fortresses are found they only testify to fallen dominion. The English Government could not recognise Portugal's construction of the contested question; according to that construction the question would virtually turn upon the possession of Shireland and Mashonaland (the inland country north and south of the Zambesi). It denied Portugal's claim to this territory as so entirely groundless that it could not enter into such a question; but has on the other hand made a peremptory claim, arising from Portugal's violence towards the natives who are under England's protection, for dishonour to the English flag, and for other international offences, etc.
The right of possession of the regions in question can no longer be regarded as doubtful, since Portugal had set aside the general international axiom, that the claim for possession according to colonial usage can only be held valid when colonization is actually carried out to the furtherance of civilization and public safety. Portugal's assertion that the signatories of the Congo Act would be the right adjudicators of the question was denied, upon the ground that Portugal had delayed to make her claim valid when Nyassaland was declared to belong to the sphere of England's interests. On July 1st, 1889, the Under-secretary, Sir James Fergusson, in the Lower House, explained that the Portuguese Government had been informed that they would be held answerable for all loss which Englishmen might suffer by the annulling of the Delagoa railway convention. The same day Lord Salisbury informed the Upper House that the English Government would send three war-ships to Delagoa Bay, to be ready in case of need. Portugal's conduct was, in his opinion, unjustifiable.
Arnoldson, a Swedish parliamentarian, structures his argument around four concrete mechanisms—arbitration, neutrality, international law, and disarmament—rather than abstract pacifism. The book opens with a prefatory note by J.F.G. and an introduction by the Bishop of Durham, framing the work as a practical statesman's assessment. Arnoldson grounds his analysis in specific treaty obligations and constitutional provisions, such as the Swedo-Norse cabinet councils and the Riksdag's role in treaty confirmation, avoiding generalities.
Constitutional Checks on War Powers
Arnoldson devotes careful attention to the mechanisms by which a nation may be drawn into war without full legislative consent. He cites three instances where Sweden-Norway narrowly avoided entanglement due to treaties the king could enter without cabinet approval: the Crimean War, the Dano-German War, and the Franco-German War. In each case, external events—the Peace of Paris, the death of King Frederic VII, the battle of Wörth—intervened. Arnoldson proposes amending constitutional formulas so that treaties involving political entanglement require confirmation by the Riksdag and Storting, comparing this to existing requirements for commercial treaties, which he calls "bagatelles" in contrast.
Parliamentary Efforts in England
The author tracks parallel reform efforts in the British House of Commons. In 1886, Henry Richard moved to abolish the sovereign's right to declare war without Parliament's consent; the motion was defeated but garnered 109 votes against 115. In 1889, W.R. Cremer proposed a parliamentary committee to examine foreign affairs before they were laid before the House. Though both attempts failed, Arnoldson treats the narrowing margins as "a remarkable sign of the times." He notes Cremer's intention to renew the motion, indicating a persistent, incremental pressure on executive war powers.
Economic Interdependence as a Neutralizing Force
Arnoldson draws on an article by Belgian economist de Molinari to illustrate how the internationalization of trade and capital has transformed the stakes of war. In 1613, England's total imports and exports were only five million pounds; two centuries later, the entire European trade was less than modern Belgium's. Foreign loans were negligible, and neutral states suffered little from distant conflicts. By the 1890s, world foreign trade had reached about five thousand million pounds, and capital investments crossed borders extensively. Arnoldson implies that this economic solidarity makes war increasingly costly for neutrals, creating a structural incentive for peace.
The Tone of a Practical Statesman
Throughout the excerpts, Arnoldson maintains a measured, evidence-driven voice. He does not appeal to emotion or moral outrage but to constitutional specifics and historical precedents. The Bishop of Durham's introduction notes that Arnoldson "indulges in no illusions" and "marks the chief dangers without dissembling their gravity." The author's own prose is direct: he calls assertions about royal power "simply an assertion, refuted by experience." This forensic style, grounded in parliamentary procedure and treaty texts, distinguishes the work from more rhetorical peace literature of the era.
Readers will find that Arnoldson's value lies not in prophecy but in the documentary record he assembles—treaty clauses, parliamentary votes, trade figures—and in his insistence on institutional design. The book is best approached as a primary source for late-19th-century legal and political thought on war prevention, particularly the Scandinavian dimension often overlooked in English-language histories.
That rainy afternoon, Pax mundi left me pondering how nations might dissolve into something quieter. My mind drifted, almost by accident, to cellular mortality, to the strange grace of endings. I found myself reaching for Death and resurrection from the point of view of the cell-theory — Story, Setting & Ideas, and the rain felt softer, more patient.
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