The Book of War: The Military Classic of the Far East The Articles of Suntzu; The Sayings of Wutzu — Background and Themes

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Authors: Sunzi, active 6th century B.C., Wu, Qi, 441 BCE-382 BCE, Calthrop, Everard Ferguson, 1876-1915 [Translator] Digital Source: Project Gutenberg Gutenberg Release Year: 2013 First Publication Year: Not confirmed

Key Word: Military art and science -- Early works to 1800; War -- Early works to 1800; Strategy -- Early works to 1800 Target Reader: Readers of public-domain and historical texts

Book Edition: Project Gutenberg digital edition Book Language: en

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Words 23,771

Reading time 104 min

Text sections 4

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Source: Project Gutenberg record #44024

This edition pairs two ancient Chinese military treatises, Sunzi's Articles and Wutzu's Sayings, translated by Captain E. F. Calthrop. The texts emphasize strategic principles over specific tactics, with recurring imagery of terrain, troop psychology, and the general's decisive role.

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Nore: Images of the original pages are available through Internet Archive. See https://archive.org/details/bookofwarmilitar00caltiala

Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_).

Changes made are listed at the end of the text.

The Military Classic of the Far East

Translated from the Chinese by

CAPTAIN E. F. CALTHROP, R.F.A.

London John Murray, Albemarle St., W. 1908

THE ARTICLES OF SUNTZU

I. PRELIMINARY RECKONING 17

II. OPERATIONS OF WAR 20

III. THE ATTACK BY STRATAGEM 24

IV. THE ORDER OF BATTLE 28

V. THE SPIRIT OF THE TROOPS 31

VI. EMPTINESS AND STRENGTH 34

VII. BATTLE TACTICS 40

VIII. THE NINE CHANGES 44

IX. MOVEMENT OF TROOPS 47

XII. ASSAULT BY FIRE 67

XIII. THE EMPLOYMENT OF SPIES 70

I. THE GOVERNMENT OF A COUNTRY 77

II. ESTIMATION OF THE ENEMY 85

III. CONTROL OF THE ARMY 93

IV. QUALITIES OF THE GENERAL 101

V. SUITING THE OCCASION 108

VI. ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE TROOPS 116

Written in the fifth century B.C., Suntzu and Wutzu still remain the most celebrated works on war in the literature of China. While the chariot has gone, and weapons have changed, these ancient masters have held their own, since they deal chiefly with the fundamental principles of war, with the influence of politics and human nature on military operations; and they show in a most striking way how unchanging these principles are.

When these books were written, China was a conglomerate of principalities in continual ferment. Personal ambition and intrigue, and not the wishes of the people, were the main factors in these wars. Patriotism, or a popular cause, could not, therefore, be relied on to maintain the _moral_ of the levies. Instead of these, what may be called the force of despair is pointed out as the most powerful agent in giving cohesion and energy to an army. The general is urged to take a vigorous offensive; and to act at a distance from his base, where defeat means disaster, and where desertion is minimised owing to the distance from home. He should, in fact, burn his boats before an action, or, in Chinese phrase, act as one who removes the ladder from under those mounted upon the roof.

On the other hand, every care must be taken not to render the enemy desperate; and, as an instance of this, Sun observes that an opponent should on no account be completely surrounded. A loop-hole of escape weakens the resolution of the general and the energy of his troops.

It is interesting to notice that _moral_, or the spirit of the troops, is thus considered a determining factor in war. The Chinese are perhaps unusually affected by climatic conditions. As is well known, the umbrella was part of a soldier's equipment; and for the same reasons, the sunny side of high ground is recommended as most suitable for defence, tactical considerations permitting.

The large number of bannermen in the Chinese army was out of all proportion to the service of standards in providing rallying points. The chief use of banners was to maintain the spirit of the troops. A forest of banners, held erect, gave a feeling of liveliness and security to the ranks, in the same way as a military band, and when Sun remarks that the march of an army should be calm like the forest, he is using a simile that is not inappropriate.

Probably owing to the fact that the profession of arms has never been highly regarded in China, we find that the ruler of the state did not usually take the field, but employed a professional to command the army--one of the masters of war who wandered from state to state at that time with the secrets of victory to impart to the highest bidder. The question of political interference with the general in the field naturally arises under these conditions. The two sages point out, that to unite the nation under firm and just government is the business of the ruler and necessary to victory; but that the general is the best judge of the questions that arise on a distant field, and that all interference with him causes delay and disaster.

War meaning ravage, it was essential that the operations should be conducted in the enemy's territory. Once there, however, a vigorous offensive is no longer advised. "At first behave with the discretion of a maiden" is the counsel of Sun. The enemy must be induced to take the initiative, and when he is worn out by marching, or makes a false move, "then," says the master, "dart in like a rabbit."

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The volume opens with Sunzi's Preliminary Reckoning, where the outcome of war is calculated through five constant factors: moral law, heaven, earth, the commander, and discipline. This framing establishes a pattern of systematic analysis that recurs throughout both treatises. Wutzu's Sayings later mirrors this structure, beginning with The Government of a Country and moving through estimation, control, and qualities of leadership. The translator's introduction notes that these works, though composed in the fifth century B.C., remain relevant because they address unchanging principles of war, politics, and human nature.

Recurring Images of Terrain and Movement

Both Sunzi and Wutzu repeatedly invoke physical landscapes to illustrate strategic concepts. Sunzi devotes entire chapters to Ground and Nine Grounds, classifying terrain into categories such as “dispersive,” “frontier,” “key,” and “desperate.” Each type dictates specific tactical responses: on “desperate ground,” where retreat is impossible, the general must fight with utmost resolve. Wutzu similarly advises studying the enemy’s environment, noting that the nature of a state—whether its terrain is rugged or weak—shapes its army’s character. The image of the general who “removes the ladder from under those mounted upon the roof” recurs as a metaphor for cutting off escape to heighten desperation. This emphasis on spatial conditions gives the texts a concrete, almost cartographic quality.

The Psychology of Troops and Desperation

A central thread in both works is the manipulation of morale through calculated pressure. Sunzi argues that an army fighting far from home, with no line of retreat, will fight with the “force of despair.” He warns against completely surrounding an enemy, as a loop-hole of escape weakens their resolve. Wutzu echoes this in his advice to “act as one who removes the ladder.” The excerpts show a consistent interest in the emotional states of soldiers: fear, greed, exhaustion, and pride are all treated as levers the commander can pull. Wutzu’s analysis of six enemy states—Chi, Chin, Chu, Yen, and the three Chins—reads each nation’s temperament and exploits its weaknesses, such as Chi’s “stubborn” nature or Chu’s “short endurance.”

Structure as a Mirror of Strategy

The arrangement of the two treatises itself reflects strategic thinking. Sunzi’s thirteen articles progress from broad calculation (Preliminary Reckoning) to specific operations (Assault by Fire, The Employment of Spies), each building on the last. Wutzu’s six sections follow a similar arc: governance, estimation, control, qualities of the general, suiting the occasion, and encouragement. This parallel structure suggests a deliberate pedagogical design, moving from abstract principles to concrete applications. The translator’s introduction reinforces this by noting that the works “deal chiefly with the fundamental principles of war,” implying that the form of the text—its orderly progression—mirrors the disciplined approach it advocates.

The General as Architect of Victory

Both Sunzi and Wutzu place extraordinary responsibility on the commander. Sunzi’s Order of Battle and Spirit of the Troops emphasize that victory depends on the general’s ability to assess conditions, adapt tactics, and inspire loyalty. Wutzu’s Qualities of the General lists five traits: reason, preparation, determination, vigilance, and simplicity. The general must also select and honour exceptional soldiers—“mighty warriors with strength to lift the Censer”—who become the “life of the army.” This focus on individual leadership, rather than mass formations, gives the texts a personal, almost biographical dimension. The general is not merely a strategist but a moral and psychological force, whose decisions shape the fate of thousands.

Readers approaching these texts will find that the translator’s 1908 edition preserves the aphoristic, often paradoxical style of the originals. The works reward careful attention to recurring motifs—terrain, morale, deception—rather than a search for tactical formulas. Because the excerpts are incomplete, some sections, such as Sunzi’s Nine Changes or Wutzu’s Encouragement of the Troops, are only partially glimpsed. Nonetheless, the core principles of adaptability, psychological insight, and disciplined leadership emerge clearly, offering a window into ancient Chinese military thought that remains strikingly modern in its emphasis on human factors over brute force.

Reading about Sunzi’s careful reading of terrain, I remembered sitting with my grandfather’s old maps, tracing rivers that no longer ran. That quiet patience—waiting for the right moment—reminded me of how Byways of Ghost-Land — A Closer Reading once made me sit with a half-remembered face, letting it return on its own. Both books felt less like instructions, more like doors left ajar.